Open AccessFederal and Subnational Fiscal Power in Canada and the US
Author(s) -
Jeffrey Li
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
federalism-e journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2562-3435
DOI - 10.24908/fede.v22i1.14685
Subject(s) - conditionality , fiscal federalism , revenue , state (computer science) , independence (probability theory) , government (linguistics) , fiscal imbalance , power (physics) , balance (ability) , fiscal union , politics , political science , economics , economic policy , fiscal policy , decentralization , finance , macroeconomics , market economy , philosophy , mathematics , algorithm , law , linguistics , computer science , quantum mechanics , medicine , statistics , physics , physical medicine and rehabilitation
This paper examines the fiscal balance of power between national and subnational governments in Canada and the US. While it is generally acknowledged that Canadian provinces are more autonomous than American states in terms of own-source revenues and the conditionality of transfers, I argue that political dynamics within and between the two levels of government significantly impact the ability of federal governments to exercise their fiscal power on the subnational units. Even though Canada has more decentralized fiscal arrangements, the independence of its federal government and the interdependence of American federal-state relations results in a greater degree of federal fiscal power in Canada.