Open AccessProblems With the Notion of Freedom and Voluntariness in Right Libertarianism
Author(s) -
Igor Wysocki
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
studia humana
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2299-0518
DOI - 10.2478/sh-2020-0021
Subject(s) - voluntariness , libertarianism , law and economics , coercion (linguistics) , redistribution (election) , incompatibilism , law , indeterminism , political science , compatibilism , sociology , epistemology , philosophy , determinism , moral responsibility , politics , linguistics
In this short paper, we investigate the problems with the employment of the notion of freedom and voluntariness in libertarianism. We pretend to demonstrate that these two, as conceived of by libertarians, figure in as the main issue when it comes to justifying its major institutions, say: bequeathing, gifts, transactions (or what they label as “voluntary transfer”). The difficulty here boils down to the fact that a purely rights-based idea of freedom and voluntariness, the pretentions of Nozick notwithstanding, cannot do alone, since it is the consideration whether we do something (e.g. bequeath, donate etc.) voluntarily (or freely ) (in a non-moralized sense) that could account for the rights redistribution. Therefore, it seems that – at least sometimes – the notion of voluntariness (or freedom) is prior to the notion of rights.