Open AccessThe Hard Terminological Problem of Consciousness
Author(s) -
Alexander Boldachev
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
studia humana
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2299-0518
DOI - 10.2478/sh-2019-0028
Subject(s) - consciousness , epistemology , subject (documents) , meaning (existential) , action (physics) , identity (music) , philosophy , psychology , sociology , computer science , aesthetics , physics , quantum mechanics , library science
This article demonstrates that certain issues of philosophy of mind can only be explained via strict observance of the logical law of identity, that is, use of the term “consciousness” in only one meaning. Based on the understanding of consciousness as space in which objects distinguished by the subject are represented, this article considers problems such as the fixation of the consciousness level, correlation between consciousness and thought, between the internal and the external, and between consciousness and the body. It demonstrates the insufficiency of the reactive conception of action for the resolution of the hard problem of consciousness and the necessity of a transition to an active paradigm in which many issues in philosophy of mind would be formulated differently.