Open AccessThe German Bundesrat and Executive Federalism
Author(s) -
Matthias Niedobitek
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
perspectives on federalism
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.132
H-Index - 3
ISSN - 2036-5438
DOI - 10.2478/pof-2018-0023
Subject(s) - federalism , german , political science , legislation , cooperative federalism , separation of powers , law and economics , public administration , business , constitution , politics , law , economics , archaeology , history
The German Basic Law constitutes federalism as a unique political system which is characterised by intertwined decision-making of the Federation (Bund) and the component units (Länder). The executives of the two federal tiers and the Länder executives within the Bundesrat play a major role in making joint decisions. They are forced to make decisions in the ‘joint-decision mode’ (Politikverflechtung) which is detrimental to accountability. Reform efforts were made to unbundle competences and to reduce the number of bills which require the Bundesrat’s consent. Due to the dominance of the executives and the distribution of powers between the federal tiers (legislation is dominated by the Bund, execution is dominated by the Länder), German federalism is rightly called ‘executive federalism’. German federalism can even be regarded as an embodiment of that concept since it covers all possible aspects of ‘executive federalism’. The Bundesrat has an important share in that classification.