Open AccessF.H. Bradley: ¿un espinosista hegeliano?
Author(s) -
Michele Cardani
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
studia hegeliana
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2792-176X
pISSN - 2444-0809
DOI - 10.24310/stheg.v0i2.3706
Subject(s) - philosophy , hegelianism , idealism , german idealism , metaphysics , humanities , transcendence (philosophy) , context (archaeology) , mysticism , theology , epistemology , paleontology , biology
Resumen: La doctrina de Spinoza constituye una de las principales inspiraciones del más célebre entre los idealistas británicos, F.H. Bradley, cuya filosofía se caracteriza a su vez por elementos típicos del idealismo alemán y, en particular, de Hegel. Según A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, la presencia de estas dos tendencias conflictivas reduce el planteamiento de Appearance and Reality a una disposición filosófica esencialmente mística. Sin embargo, a pesar de las reales influencias de Spinoza y Hegel en el contexto del idealismo británico, los cimientos de la metafísica bradleyana (la incognoscibilidad de lo Absoluto, su transcendencia respecto al pensamiento, el rechazo del panteísmo y del panlogismo) sugieren una postura difícilmente identificable con Spinoza o Hegel, o con ambos. Palabras clave: Absoluto - Idealismo británico – Monismo – Panlogismo - Panteísmo.Abstract: Spinoza’s doctrine represents one of the greatest inspirations for the most well-known representative of the British Idealism, F.H. Bradley, whose philosophy is also marked by some of the most typical elements of German Idealism, especially those of Hegel. According to Seth Pringle-Pattison, the presence of these conflictive tendencies reduce the standpoint of Appearance and Reality to an essentially mystic philosophical attitude. However, despite the real influences of Spinoza and Hegel in the context of British Idealism, the foundations of Bradley’s metaphysics (the unknowability of the Absolute and its transcendence, as well as the rejection of pantheism and panlogism) suggest that Bradley is defending a perspective that can hardly be identified with Spinoza or Hegel, or with both of them. Key words: Absolute - British Idealism – Monism – Panlogism - Pantheism.