Open AccessDISIPLIN PASAR DAN MORAL HAZARD BANK
Author(s) -
Nur Ariani Aqidah
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
al-amwal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2541-3910
pISSN - 2541-0105
DOI - 10.24256/alw.v2i1.536
Subject(s) - moral hazard , transparency (behavior) , market discipline , agency (philosophy) , business , actuarial science , principal–agent problem , economics , financial system , law and economics , accounting , finance , law , political science , sociology , market economy , corporate governance , social science , incentive
This paper aims to explain the relationship between market discipline and moral hazard banks. Market discipline is one of the three pillars formed by the Basel Committee in improving banking performance and transparency through supervision carried out by depositors. While moral hazard is high risk taking by the bank. Market discipline and bank moral hazard can be understood using agency theory.