Open AccessImpact of goal-setting and feedback on negotiators performance in multilateral negotiation
Author(s) -
Hea Kyung Ro
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
han'gug simlihag hoeji. san'eob mich jo'jig/korean journal of industrial and organizational psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2671-4345
pISSN - 1229-0696
DOI - 10.24230/kjiop.v30i2.299-328
Subject(s) - negotiation , task (project management) , competition (biology) , settlement (finance) , psychology , extension (predicate logic) , social psychology , process management , microeconomics , computer science , political science , economics , business , management , law , ecology , world wide web , payment , biology , programming language
Multilateral negotiation is a difficult task for the amicable settlement because of its structural complexity. Therefore, the strategy of problem solving which is commonly used in bilateral negotiation is not readily applicable. This study tries to find an integrative strategy in multilateral negotiations that brings all win-win benefts rather than competition or coaltion for some. To improve the efficiency of multilateral negotiation, the effects of Goal Setting and Feedback were tested. With the 3 studies it was found that amicalbe netotiation is really difficult if the interest structure is incompatible, higher Goal Setting bring rather negative negotiation results, and feedbacks, which lead to the flexible search to the alternative options, are very helpful for good results. We discussed the theoretical extension and the practical implications of these studies.