
Zagzebski on Rationality
Author(s) -
Duncan Pritchard,
Shane Ryan
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
european journal for philosophy of religion
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.25
H-Index - 9
ISSN - 1689-8311
DOI - 10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143
Subject(s) - rationality , skepticism , epistemology , autonomy , section (typography) , set (abstract data type) , principle of rationality , ecological rationality , sociology , philosophy , political science , computer science , law , programming language , operating system
This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem.