Open AccessThe Guilty Mind
Author(s) -
William E. Mann
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
european journal for philosophy of religion
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.25
H-Index - 9
ISSN - 1689-8311
DOI - 10.24204/ejpr.v1i1.329
Subject(s) - culpability , mens rea , doctrine , criminal liability , psychology , liability , law and economics , strict liability , sermon , criminal law , criminology , epistemology , law , political science , philosophy , sociology , theology
The doctrine of mens rea can be expressed in this way: MRP: If A is culpable for performing φ, then A performs φ intentionally in circumstances in which it is impermissible to perform φ. The Sermon on the Mount suggests the following principle: SMP: If A intends to perform φ in circumstances in which it would be impermissible for A to perform φ, then A’s intending to perform φ makes A as culpable as A would be were A to perform φ. MRP and SMP are principles representative of intentionalism, a family of views that emphasizes the importance of intention to judgments about culpability. This essay examines an intentionalist’s defense of MRP with respect to lying, strict criminal liability, and the distinction between intention and foreseeability, along with a defense of SMP with respect to failed attempts, and self-defense.