Legal nature and place of judicial precedent in the system of sources of law of Ukraine

This article is devoted to the analysis of the essence of judicial precedent as a source of law in Ukraine, its legal nature and the definition of the place among the sources of national law. The issue of judicial precedent, its role has worried many scholars of the Soviet Union, and now it is the focus of many scholars and is central to the study of jurisprudence. Given the determination of the place of precedent among the sources of law, a general analysis of the system of sources of law in Ukraine is conducted. During the analysis the structure of judicial precedent is considered on the example of the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, several alternative definitions of the term "judicial precedent" are given. Some scholars suggest that "judicial precedent" is a decision based on a general rule of law created by a court that courts of the same or lower instance must comply with, and that their decisions in future cases should be based on this rule of law. The article establishes the role of judicial precedent in the legal system of Ukraine, emphasizes its importance in that it significantly increases the motivation of court decisions. Attention is also paid to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights - a typical example of judicial precedent - as a mandatory source of law in Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on the positive and negative consequences of the official recognition of judicial precedent as a source of law in Ukraine. Considerable attention is also paid to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the legal positions of the Supreme Court. The authors emphasize the recommendatory nature, in addition to the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights, judicial precedent as a source of law. This is confirmed by the thesis that the rule of law can be reflected in laws and regulations, as judicial precedent is not officially recognized as a source of law in Ukraine, it is believed that court decisions do not create rules of law. The authors emphasize the need for recognition at the legislative level of judicial precedent as a source of law.