Open AccessBUILDING THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM IN THE PROBLEM OF INNOVATION IMPLEMENTATION MANAGEMENT
Author(s) -
Д Л Нинидзе,
А. Б. Усов
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
èkologiâ. èkonomika. informatika. tom 1: sistemnyj analiz i modelirovanie èkonomičeskih i èkologičeskih sistem
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2500-395X
DOI - 10.23885/2500-395x-2020-1-5-76-80
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , promotion (chess) , production (economics) , business , retraining , restructuring , task (project management) , industrial organization , function (biology) , economics , marketing , microeconomics , finance , management , evolutionary biology , politics , political science , international trade , law , biology
We investigate the mathematical model of coordination of private and public interests at introduction of innovations. Innovation is broadly understood as the profitable use of innovations in the form of new technologies, products and services, organizational, technical and socio-economic solutions of industrial, financial, commercial, administrative or other nature. Innovation affects the structure of production enterprises in the country, the level of development of society. The introduction of innovations requires restructuring of the existing production, retraining of employees, capital costs and at the same time is associated with the risk of not suffering losses and getting the necessary result. The main task of mathematical modeling of coordination of private and public interests in the models of innovation promotion is to determine the appropriate strategy to promote innovation, provided that the maximum income of persons promoting innovation. The agent promotes innovation, for which he receives income from production from the supervisor, but at the same time has personal expenses during implementation. In addition, the agent has its own private interest, namely, engaged in third-party activities not related to the promotion of innovation, which also brings him income. The model uses a motivation in which the supervisor acts on the target function of the agent. We consider the various Internet articles on the topic of how to embed innovation in the company. The problem is investigated using Stackelberg algorithms. Thus, the results were obtained during the study.