Open AccessMODELING AN EFFECTIVE CONCERT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A MUSIC CLUB
Author(s) -
V.A. Goncharov,
А. Б. Усов
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
èkologiâ. èkonomika. informatika. tom 1: sistemnyj analiz i modelirovanie èkonomičeskih i èkologičeskih sistem
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2500-395X
DOI - 10.23885/2500-395x-2020-1-5-35-39
Subject(s) - supervisor , club , popularity , stackelberg competition , computer science , renting , set (abstract data type) , incentive , subject (documents) , operations research , microeconomics , mathematics , mathematical economics , psychology , economics , engineering , management , social psychology , world wide web , medicine , civil engineering , anatomy , programming language
In the modern world, cultural and leisure activities are more developed than ever. One of the sides of its manifestation is the growing popularity of concerts of various musical groups. The article sets and solves the problem of mathematical modeling of the relationship between the management of a music group and the management of a club that provides a rental venue for performances. We use a static two-level hierarchically organized model that describes the interaction of managers of a music club (supervisor) and a music group (agent). The top – level subject is the supervisor, and the bottom-level subject is the agent. The agent generates their winnings by changing the cost of concert tickets in response to the supervisor’s announced strategy. The supervisor’s winnings vary depending on the price they set for renting the venue for the group’s performance. Target functions of both participants are constructed. The incentive method is used as a method of hierarchical management. The algorithm for constructing the Stackelberg equilibrium for a two-level hierarchical game is specified. An analytical study was conducted for a particular type of input functions. Examples of analytical finding of equilibrium are given. An analysis of the results obtained is given, on the basis of which conclusions are made about the type of optimal management of the supervisor and agent.