BERKELEY ON PERCEPTUAL DISCRIMINATION OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS
Author(s) -
Keota Fields
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
history of philosophy quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.175
H-Index - 7
eISSN - 2152-1026
pISSN - 0740-0675
DOI - 10.2307/48614940
Subject(s) - perception , object (grammar) , reading (process) , motion (physics) , psychology , sense (electronics) , cognitive psychology , philosophy , epistemology , computer science , artificial intelligence , linguistics , electrical engineering , engineering
Commentators are divided over whether Berkeley holds that physical objects are immediately perceived by sense. As I read Berkeley, discrimination is necessary for perceiving physical objects by sense. He says that discrimination requires a perception of motion. Since motions can only be mediately perceived, according to Berkeley, physical objects can be perceived by sense only mediately. I defend this reading against three objections. I also propose a new objection to the claim that physical objects are immediately perceived for Berkeley. I argue that immediate perception is neither necessary nor sufficient to perceive an object by sense, according to Berkeley.
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