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Improving compliance with state environmental regulations
Author(s) -
Burby Raymond J.,
Paterson Robert G.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.2307/3325349
Subject(s) - compliance (psychology) , state (computer science) , business , environmental compliance , environmental protection , environmental science , computer science , psychology , social psychology , algorithm
This article reports on empirical tests of two theories for improving compliance with state environmental regulations. One theory argues for centralization of enforcement responsibilities with state agencies, while the other focuses on enforcement strategies, arguing for an approach that emphasizes capacity building and the social and moral bases of compliance in addition to deterrence and the threatened application of sanctions. Using evidence from North Carolina, we show that centralization does not necessarily enhance compliance, but cooperative enforcement strategies can improve the effectiveness of regulations that seek to attain performance standards. Compliance with simpler specification standards, however, can be attained just as well with easier to administer deterrent enforcement strategies based on frequent inspections and adequate sanctions.