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Cognitive Science, Bayesian Norms and Rules of Evidence
Author(s) -
Callen Craig R.
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
journal of the royal statistical society: series a (statistics in society)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.103
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1467-985X
pISSN - 0964-1998
DOI - 10.2307/2982706
Subject(s) - bayesian probability , cognition , bayesian statistics , computer science , psychology , cognitive psychology , bayesian inference , artificial intelligence , neuroscience
SUMMARY This paper analyses arguments that Bayesian personalist models should be normative in the formulation of evidence rules for litigation (Fienberg and Schervish, 1986; Lempert, 1986). Relying on research from cognitive science, it concludes that the models are poor sources for such norms because their empirical assumptions about human cognition are inaccurate.