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Measuring the Extent of Coalition Formation in Group Decision Making
Author(s) -
Ruppel Fred J.,
Kennedy P. Lynn
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1244285
Subject(s) - voting , group decision making , asset (computer security) , context (archaeology) , group (periodic table) , set (abstract data type) , mathematical economics , relevance (law) , microeconomics , economics , majority rule , process (computing) , distribution (mathematics) , computer science , political science , psychology , social psychology , artificial intelligence , mathematics , law , computer security , mathematical analysis , chemistry , organic chemistry , politics , programming language , operating system , paleontology , biology
Many group decisions begin with small coalitions that recruit additional members until they satisfy a voting rule. This paper introduces a technique for measuring coalition formation in group decision making. The setting involves N players bargaining over the share distribution of an asset. The N ‐person game is analyzed as a set of triads, numerically equal to { N !/( N — 3)!}/3!. A three‐person game is presented to establish the context and to offer insights into the bargaining process. A four‐person game is also presented. The technique finds immediate application in controlled laboratory experiments but has further relevance for numerous real‐world contexts.