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Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application
Author(s) -
LataczLohmann Uwe,
Van der Hamsvoort Carel
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1244139
Subject(s) - bidding , common value auction , microeconomics , payment , information asymmetry , mechanism design , economics , business , industrial organization , finance
Auction theory is used to analyze the potential benefits of auctions in allocating contracts for the provision of nonmarket goods in the countryside. A model of optimal bidding for conservation contracts is developed and applied to a hypothetical conservation program. Competitive bidding, compared to fixed‐rate payments, can increase the cost effectiveness of conservation contracting significantly. The cost revelation mechanism inherent in the bidding process makes auctions a powerful means by which to reduce the problems of information asymmetry. Strategic bidding behavior, which may adversely affect the performance of sequential auctions, is difficult to address by means of auction design.