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A Game‐Theoretic Model of Endogenous Public Policies
Author(s) -
Beghin John C.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1243153
Subject(s) - comparative statics , economics , outcome (game theory) , microeconomics , game theory , process (computing) , politics , sequential game , public economics , computer science , political science , law , operating system
Public policies are the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game among interest groups and the policy maker. This study stresses the interdependence between policies and players' bargaining strengths and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. It also provides a specification of behavioral equations consistent with the underlying bargaining process. An analysis of the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal illustrates the proposed framework.