Premium
Grain Policy in Chinese Villages: Yield Response to Pricing, Procurement, and Loan Policies
Author(s) -
Rozelle Scott,
Boisvert Richard N.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1242918
Subject(s) - procurement , loan , discretion , control (management) , yield (engineering) , china , business , economics , finance , marketing , materials science , management , political science , law , metallurgy
This paper assesses the effects of pricing, procurement, and loan policies on China's grain economy. A dynamic control model of the village leader is specified. Parameters of structural and control equations are estimated using time‐series cross‐section data. Simulation results show that pricing and procurement policies are not effective in raising yields, because of conflicting objectives of local officials. Loan policies can increase yields. The paper concludes that rural policies often have contradictory effects that can arise for a number of reasons. An important reason is the fact that local officials in a reforming economy have greater decision‐making discretion than higher‐level officials and execute policies to meet their own objectives.