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On Moral Hazard and Cost Sharing under Sharecropping
Author(s) -
Bardhan Pranab,
Singh Nirvikar
Publication year - 1987
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1242289
Subject(s) - sharecropping , landlord , moral hazard , economics , microeconomics , margin (machine learning) , renting , incentive , computer science , agriculture , ecology , machine learning , political science , law , biology
Abstract In this article we show that when the tenant's input use is not observable by the landlord, there will be cost sharing at the margin (instead of a lump sum transfer) if the standard model is extended to include cases of imperfection and interlinkage of transactions in rural markets, thus making the opportunity cost of inputs different for the landlord and the tenant.