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Subjective Probabilities and Scoring Rules: Experimental Evidence
Author(s) -
Nelson Robert G.,
Bessler David A.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1241594
Subject(s) - exploit , range (aeronautics) , scoring rule , econometrics , test (biology) , outcome (game theory) , articulation (sociology) , computer science , psychology , cognitive psychology , statistics , mathematics , mathematical economics , paleontology , computer security , politics , political science , law , biology , materials science , composite material
This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects in a probability forecasting experiment. Results suggest that theory holds when subjects forecast over many periods, although inexperienced subjects may fail to exploit the dominant strategy in the initial periods.