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Oligopolistic Behavior by Public Agencies in International Trade: The World Wheat Market
Author(s) -
Paarlberg Philip L.,
Abbott Philip C.
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1241538
Subject(s) - oligopoly , economics , politics , function (biology) , international trade , public policy , commercial policy , face (sociological concept) , microeconomics , political science , economic growth , social science , sociology , evolutionary biology , cournot competition , law , biology
A model of the world wheat market is presented which treats public policies as endogenous. The oligopolistic nature of international wheat trade is captured by assuming policy makers form conjectures on the slope of the excess demand function they face and use that information to determine domestic and trade policies. The policies reflect differing influences of political interest groups. A U.S. crop shortfall scenario illustrates the different results with endogenous policies compared to the traditional model.