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Cross‐Compliance for Erosion Control: Anticipating Efficiency and Distributive Impacts
Author(s) -
Ervin David E.,
Heffernan William D.,
Green Gary P.
Publication year - 1984
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.2307/1240793
Subject(s) - incentive , soil conservation , equity (law) , distributive property , compliance (psychology) , economics , control (management) , natural resource economics , business , erosion control , environmental economics , product (mathematics) , agriculture , public economics , environmental resource management , erosion , microeconomics , political science , geography , mathematics , psychology , social psychology , management , pure mathematics , paleontology , geometry , archaeology , law , biology
Despite increasing attention, the effects of using differential agricultural program benefits to achieve soil conservation are largely unexplored. Viewed in a conventional environmental economics framework, the popularly perceived cross‐compliance program may fall short on efficiency grounds. Analysis suggests that the greatest incentive to practice conservation may occur on land with little or no net social benefits forthcoming from erosion control. A by‐product of cross‐compliance worth consideration is that those likely to benefit most from the program are the highest equity and largest farm operators.