To understand time from the time?: The role of ′Marburg′ notion of time in Heidegger's confrontation with Hegel

This article discusses Heidegger's thesis that one cannot talk about Hegel's essential advancement from the inherited notion of time. Due to the ambivalent interpretation - according to which Hegel's notion of time was both not respected enough, but also vulgar; that from him one should not learn about temporality, but that his standpoint can still serve as a proper example of everyday time - Heidegger opted for the reciprocal historical-philosophical reflection with the goal to show the direct interdependence between Aristotle's and Hegel's understanding of time. The problematic assumption in that interpretation consists of Heidegger's emphasis on the constructive, and thus pronouncedly controversial link between history and spirit, which tries to deny the unique, historical movement of the spirit. Heidegger's diagnosis might not be problematic if his interpretation of Hegel's philosophy were not directed to a concrete perspective of thought, focused on the mechanism which in a way completes the spirit of the new-age ontology. Moreover, historical fulfillment of the epoch-making model of ontology is closely related to the dominance of the natural understanding of time which also reached its peak in Hegel. In other words, regardless of the issue about its foundedness, Heidegger's conviction that Hegel indicates a peak in the vulgar interpretation of time implies nothing else but the idea of the historical development of spirit. With misunderstandings which inevitably follow when the interpretation of natural time of finite beings is proclaimed to be a ′natural′, i.e. everyday and philosophically irrelevant attitude to time - one should recognize why Hegel's phenomenology of time is being fundamentally-ontologically deformed with Heidegger