
Nationalism among the Croats
Author(s) -
Bogdan Prica
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
zbornik matice srpske za društvene nauke/zbornik matice srpske za društvene nauke
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-0836
pISSN - 0352-5732
DOI - 10.2298/zmsdn0417103p
Subject(s) - nationalism , serbian , feudalism , agrarian society , ancient history , state (computer science) , nobility , law , history , croatian , gentry , economic history , political science , politics , archaeology , philosophy , linguistics , algorithm , computer science , agriculture
These are the three lectures about Croatian nationalism presented in the Serbian Culture Club in 1940. They review the history of the Croato-Serbian relations in a specific way, from the time when the Serbs settled in the regions of the former Croatian medieval state, after the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, after the fall of Bosnia in 1463 and after the Mohács Battle in 1526, till the period preceding World War II. Comparing Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the author points out that nationalism among the Croats appeared relatively late, that it did not have deeper folk roots and that at first it was the nationalism of the upper class. It was a feudal-estate nationalism but later there also appeared Austro-Catholic nationalism of the lower class in the regions under the Habsburgs. Enmity, hatred towards the Serbs and Serbophobia were the common features of these two nationalisms. The author points out that the feudal-estate nationalism of the upper class was caused by the state-legal and agrarian-legal regulation in the regions of the former Croatian kingdom settled by the Serbs. These regions, under the name of Military Border, were granted a special legal system. As for their state-legal status, the Serbs were completely excluded from the rule of the Croatian Ban the Croatian Assembly, and were under the jurisdiction of the Austrian military commanders – therefore, directly under Vienna. As for the agrarian-legal status, Vienna completely freed the inhabitants of the Border from all taxes for the Croatian gentry, who had owned these regions before the Turkish offensive; the reason was to motivate the Serbs for permanent military service at the Border and to use these regulations to lure new Serbs-solders from the neighbouring Turkish Empire. And the dynastic-catholic nationalism of the lower class clashed with the Serbs, inhabitants of the Border, primarily because of the religious intolerance, of the irresistable desire to convert the Serbs into Catholicism. In addition, envy towards the Serbs in the Border area – warriors and free men – began to develop more and more among the Croatian peasants in the Ban’s Croatia, in the so-called provincial, who still remained the serfs of their gentry. The author underlines that the Croatian Serbophobias have deep historical and social roots, and points to the typical historical facts which confirm that. Croatian nationalism withdrew only sporadically before the Illyrian Yugoslavism, which saw several rises and falls in Croatia. Yugoslavism was strengthened only when the pressure from Vienna, Pest or the Italians was stronger and, secondly, it worked only when there were chances to realize it from Zagreb, not from Belgrade. As soon as one of these two conditions was not met, Croatian spirit exclusively prevailed. The author disagrees with those who believed that the Croatian nationalism could have been neutralized by decentralization, federalization and democratization of the common state. He thinks that the Croatian nationalist movement did not want a just arrangement of the relations with the Serbs, but Croatia with the border on the Drina, in which the Serbian nation would be stifled with the use of "modern" methods. Therefore, he believes that only a resolute resistance of the Serbs in the defence of their interests could stop Croatian chauvinism