Open AccessOntological-gnoseological aspects of Plato's account of Good
Author(s) -
Časlav D. Koprivica
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
zbornik matice srpske za društvene nauke/zbornik matice srpske za društvene nauke
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-0836
pISSN - 0352-5732
DOI - 10.2298/zmsdn0315073k
Subject(s) - epistemology , transcendental number , interpretation (philosophy) , meaning (existential) , philosophy , intelligibility (philosophy) , premise , interpreter , practical reason , linguistics , computer science , programming language
This article tries to offer a specific interpretation of the meaning of Plato's account of the highest (ontological) principle of reality as Good in the new century and after the final separation of ethics from ontology that is being and validity, this must represent a significant challenge for the interpreters. It is pointed out that in Plato, Good does not have an ethical meaning - like in the meaning characteristic for the concept which divides philosophy into individual, independent disciplines; Good in general represents a transcendental determination of being (together with the one and truthful). The final basis for such interpretation of the principle of being and reality lies in the philosophical theodicy, according to which world was created as meaningful, ordered and thus good. The assumption implied in such arrangement of the world is the intelligibility of reality from which there also follows that the being is in essence constant and regular, as well as that the comprehension of such a being is possible. Consequently, that is expressed in Plato's premise that Good determines ideas both in their beingness and in their comprehensibility