Open AccessTroubles with the evolutionary theory of self-deception
Author(s) -
Igor Živanović
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo2104005z
Subject(s) - deception , self deception , offensive , psychology , interpersonal communication , social psychology , function (biology) , natural (archaeology) , epistemology , impossibility , philosophy , evolutionary biology , mathematics , history , archaeology , operations research , political science , law , biology
The evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers was the first to address the well-known psychological phenomenon of self-deception from the standpoint of natural science. According to Trivers, self-deception evolved as an offensive strategy in the evolutionary arms race between the deceiver and the deceived. Though apparently both tenable and plausible, Trivers? evolutionary theory of self-deception, which takes the enhancement of interpersonal deception as the proper function of self-deception, is burdened with the number of difficulties. In this paper, I will argue that it is conceptually impossible for self-deceivers to deceive others about false beliefs they have falsely acquired as if they were true. If interpersonal deception is the conceptual impossibility for self-deceivers, then interpersonal deception cannot be the proper function of self-deception.