
Subjectivity does not necessarily entail arbitrariness
Author(s) -
Jovan Babić
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo2101005b
Subject(s) - arbitrariness , subjectivity , commensurability (mathematics) , epistemology , realization (probability) , value (mathematics) , moral psychology , social psychology , philosophy , psychology , mathematics , statistics , geometry
The thesis of the paper is that both non-moral and moral values are subjective and also objective. Non-moral values are objective because they are subjected to commensurability and have a price. They are subjective because they depend for their existence on the fact that somebody has decided to realize an end, the realization of which is a non-moral value (if the process of realization was successful); there are indefinitely many criteria of non-moral values. Moral values are objective because the criterion of moral evaluation is one and invariable. They are subjective because their existence depends on the fact of our being interested in their existence: interest in being able to be interested. That is possible only because subjectivity does not necessarily imply arbitrariness.