Open AccessIs specificity of testimony a factor of its coherence? An example of equivalent statements
Author(s) -
Adam Nedeljković
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo2004127n
Subject(s) - coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) , set (abstract data type) , psychology , epistemology , philosophy , mathematics , computer science , statistics , programming language
If we have, on the one hand, two witnesses who, independently of one another, testify that the killer is male, and on the other hand, two witnesses who claim independently of one another, that the killer is blond, blue-eyed and overweight man, which of the two testimonies is more coherent? Could it be that the more coherent testimony is the one which offers more information? Or are they equally coherent? In short, can the amount of information, i.e. specificity of testimony, raise its coherence ? In this paper, we will defend the claim that the coherence of a set of logically equivalent statements is independent of their specificity.