Open AccessIs Sider still a perdurantist?
Author(s) -
Nikola Stamenković
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo2004111s
Subject(s) - mereology , nihilism , philosophy , universalism , vagueness , epistemology , object (grammar) , argument (complex analysis) , metaphysics , class (philosophy) , linguistics , law , political science , biochemistry , chemistry , politics , fuzzy logic
In Writing the Book of the World (2011) Theodore Sider claims that on the fundamental level of reality there are no objects composed of parts, which makes his view a version of mereological nihilism. However, in his previous book entitled Four-Dimensionalism (2001), Sider endorses mereological universalism, the thesis that every class of objects has a mereological fusion, i.e. that there exists an additional object containing those objects as parts, which plays a crucial role in his argument from vagueness in favour of perdurantism, that is the thesis of the existence of temporal parts of material objects. In this paper I will investigate whether Sider can still be a perdurantist in spite of his latest commitment to mereological nihilism.