Open AccessPersonal identity and the psychological continuity theory
Author(s) -
Mirjana Sokić
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo2003087s
Subject(s) - personal identity , argument (complex analysis) , identity (music) , epistemology , property (philosophy) , relation (database) , psychological theory , psychology , social psychology , self , philosophy , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , database , aesthetics
According to the psychological continuity theory - which is one of the most popular philosophical approaches to the problem of personal identity -some sort of psychological relation represents the necessary (although, perhaps not the sufficient) criterion of a person?s persistence through time. The main aim of this paper is to provide a detailed critical analysis of two well-known arguments against the psychological continuity theory, both of which heavily rely on the animalist view on personal identity; that is to say, on the view according to which the essential property of persons is that they are biological organisms. The first argument purports to refute the psychological continuity theory by appealing to the fact that all persons are numerically identical to fetuses and that it is utterly implausible to attribute psychological properties or capacities to fetuses. The second argument attempts to show that every person is numerically identical to the biological organism that remains after its death and which does not have any psychological properties and capabilities. Hopefully, the final result of the analysis in this paper will show that the two arguments do not represent a satisfactory alternative to the psychological continuity theory.