Holistic and conceptual character of the mental in Donald Davidson’s work

In this paper we will try to confront Quine?s and Davidson?s holistic position through Davidson?s thesis of mental as a non-ontological category. In this regard, since Davidson came to this position through the thesis of mental as a decidedly conceptual category, we will try to show how this approach does not, nevertheless, rule out the possibility of its interpretation in ontological terms. However, in what follows we will draw attention to the fact that mental can be interpreted so that it proves to be immune to ontologization in Quine?s sense. This would be the evidence of different ways, which are not necessarily compatible, to argue for Davidson?s central thesis - the thesis about holistic character of mental - as well as, which is closely related, a certain difference that exists between Davidson?s view of mental as a conceptual category on the one hand, and a holistic category on the other hand.