Open AccessThe problem of unconscious perceptual states
Author(s) -
Mirjana Sokić
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1903095s
Subject(s) - unconscious mind , direct and indirect realism , consciousness , perception , epistemology , context (archaeology) , psychology , personal unconscious , collective unconscious , a priori and a posteriori , relation (database) , cognitive science , philosophy , cognitive psychology , psychoanalysis , computer science , history , archaeology , database
According to the traditional view-most commonly associated with G. E. Moore- the relation between our perception and consciousness is conceptually necessary. This paper argues against this view. The first part of the paper discusses the concept of unconscious perception, as well as several interesting phenomena in the recent clinical literature that give us persuasive evidence against the thesis that, as a matter of conceptual or a priori necessity, perception cannot occur without consciousness. The second part of the paper provides a thorough critical analysis of the two popular positions in the philosophy of perception-namely, representationalism and relationalism- in order to determine whether and how successfully they can account for the claim about the existence of unconscious perceptual states. I conclude that, at least in the context of the philosophical debate about unconscious perception, there are strong reasons to favour the representationalist account.