Prima facie duties and the structure of ethical explanations

I begin with the thesis that the most appropriate classification of ethical theories pertains to their structural characteristics and give the advantage to the particularism/ generalism dichotomy over the deontological/teleological and act-centered/agent-centered classifications. Subsequently I use the example of Ross?s ethics of prima facie duties to illustrate how this distinction can be properly applied to a seemingly problematic case. In the first part of the paper I aim to show that Ross?s view is, in spite of its use of deontological terminology, essentially particularist. I then examine the specificities of Ross?s pluralism and explore the connection between prima facie duties and normative moral reasons. In the second part of the paper I criticize Audi?s interpretation of Ross?s ethics and show that Ross?s view doesn?t have the normative implications that Audi ascribes to it.