Open AccessThe violent intentionality of sublime
Author(s) -
Igor Cvejić
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1902053c
Subject(s) - sublime , intentionality , object (grammar) , subject (documents) , sensibility , epistemology , interpretation (philosophy) , philosophy , humanity , feeling , aesthetics , psychology , computer science , linguistics , literature , art , theology , library science
The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant?s theory of sublime the object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this problem, the ambivalent Kant?s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant?s thesis about a subreption of a respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality - sensibility brought under ideas of reason.