Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy

My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet?s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau?s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet?s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by the authors to this day. In the second part I will specify the purposes of the theorem itself, and examine its underlying assumptions. Third part will be about an interpretation of Rousseau?s theory, which is given by Grofman and Feld relying on Condorcet?s jury theorem, and about criticisms of such interpretation. In the fourth, and last, part I will focus on one particular assumption of Condorcet?s theorem, which proves to be especially problematic if we would like to apply the theorem under real-life conditions; namely, the assumption that voters choose between two options only.