Open AccessContextualism and externalism in Michael Williams’ epistemological theory
Author(s) -
Filip Čukljević
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1801025c
Subject(s) - externalism , contextualism , epistemology , internalism and externalism , philosophy , relation (database) , interpretation (philosophy) , computer science , linguistics , database
In this paper I shall deal with the relation between the contextualist and externalist elements in the epistemological theory of Michael Williams. I shall claim that Williams did not clearly explicate the true nature of that relation. Firstly, I shall briefly present Williams? contextualist theory. Then I shall expose Brian Ribeiro?s objection to Williams according to which externalism, and not contextualism, plays a key role in his theory. I shall argue against this objection. On the other hand, contrary to Williams, I shall claim that externalism is not a necessary consequence of contextualism. Williams? theory is just an externalist version of the basic contextualist standpoint. Another, Wittgensteinian version is also possible. Finally, I shall show that Williams? theory is not obviously better then Wittgensteinian one.