Semantic mentalism, intesubjecitivity and metaphysics of normativity

The subject of this paper is Kripkenstein's critique of mentalistic explanation of linguistic normativity, as well as his intersubjective conception of normativity. The author argues against dominant intepretation of Kripkenstein's view on meaning as social metaphysics of normativity, the theory which reduces language rules to community consensus. It is pointed out that Kripkenstein's rejection of mentalistic thesis that meaning is some kind of mental state in the head of a speaker results in anti-reductionistic character of intersubjective conception of normativity, which describes how we speak about difference between correct and incorrect uses of language in everyday life, but does not say what that difference is, or what it consists of. Hence, it is concluded that, according to Kripkenstein, community is the only normative tribunal in matters of language, but it's not the supreme judge because, rather than passing irrevocable judgments on correctness of individual speech acts, community actually constitutes a framework that enables the normative disputes between its members.