Open AccessWittgenstein's critique of Freud
Author(s) -
Filip Čukljević
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1703075c
Subject(s) - psychoanalytic theory , argument (complex analysis) , conceptualization , mistake , philosophy , epistemology , interpretation (philosophy) , psychoanalysis , order (exchange) , focus (optics) , psychology , law , medicine , linguistics , physics , optics , finance , political science , economics
The aim of this paper is to present the critique that Ludwig Wittgenstein directs to the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud, as well as to critically evaluate its successfulness. At the beginning I will review some of the main arguments that Wittgenstein offers against this theory. First I will consider the argument that calls into question the psychoanalytic ontology and according to which there are significant problems in its conceptualization. Then I will deal with the critique which holds that the psychoanalytic method is problematic, primarily because it is allegedly unscientific. After this I will show the third argument that attacks Freud?s assumption according to which phenomena such as dreams must have a certain essence. It will be shown that none of these arguments is entirely successful. Subsequently I will focus on the argument that is, according to some, the main Wittgenstein?s argument and according to which Freud makes a mistake by not distinguishing the concepts of cause and reason. I will claim that psychoanalysis can be defended from this objection likewise. In order to show this, I will refer to the interpretation of Freud?s teachings according to which the so-called subintentional explanations are used in psychoanalysis.