Evolutionary anti-realism in ethics

In this paper I discuss two forms of evolutionary debunking arguments. These arguments have precursors in Mackie?s Moral error theory and Harman?s challenge, i.e. the explanatory irrelevance of moral facts. The first argument is metaphysical, and I call it the argument of phylogenetic contingency. To put it simple, this argument claims that if our evolutionary past had been different, then our moral capacity, moral concepts and moral beliefs, would have been different as well. The other argument is epistemological. It is based on the Nozickean conceptions of sensitivity and truth tracking. This argument claims that, when it comes to moral capacity, in the evolutionary past there was no selection for tracking moral truths. As a result, moral beliefs are insensitive to truth. Finally, I show how conception of self-deception, which is by definition insensitive to truth, could augment these arguments and help their better articulation.