Open AccessImpenetrability of visual perception: Implications for aesthetic analysis
Author(s) -
J Vladimir Konecni
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1702005k
Subject(s) - perception , painting , cognition , visual perception , psychology , aesthetics , epistemology , cognitive science , affect (linguistics) , cognitive psychology , philosophy , art , visual arts , communication , neuroscience
Several very recent examples are critically discussed of philosophical aestheticians using psychological data allegedly showing the cognitive penetration of visual perception in order to build arguments on major issues in aesthetics: How art expertise functions (Stokes, 2014); the (in)validity of an important aspect of Arthur Danto?s theory that is based on his ?gallery of indiscernibles? (Nanay, 2015); and the claim of ?automatic? emotional impact of paintings (Bullot & Reber, 2013). The present critique of these aestheticians? theoretical endeavors is based largely on the recent analysis by Firestone and Scholl (2016) - sweeping, but most likely justified - to the effect that visual perception is encapsulated and that cognition does not affect visual perception. Additional theoretical and empirical support for the critique is derived from a nonemotivist theory of the effect of paintings (Konecni, 2015a).