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Davidson and Rorty on truth
Author(s) -
Filip Čukljević
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1701040c
Subject(s) - coherence theory of truth , pragmatic theory of truth , epistemology , philosophy , alethiology , semantic theory of truth
The aim of this study is to compare the different understandings of truth provided by Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty. First we will show how these philosophers criticise traditional notions of truth. We will then examine why Rorty?s understanding of truth is a version of the deflationary understanding of truth. On the other hand, we will see that Davidson finds the basis for his understanding of truth in the theory of truth offered by Tarski. While considering their views on the concept of truth we will take into account their different metaphilosophical motivations. Finally, it will be shown that Davidson, unlike Rorty, accepts a realistic understanding of the truth in a more decisive way.

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