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Self-deception
Author(s) -
Igor Živanović
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
theoria beograd
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1504099z
Subject(s) - deception , self deception , lying , context (archaeology) , psychology , social psychology , epistemology , philosophy , medicine , history , radiology , archaeology
In this paper I defend non-intentional conception of self-deception. First, I?ll make clear distinction between deceiving, lying, and deluding. Then, taking Cartesian metodological project as an example, I'll make a distinction between self induced deception and selfdeception. To identify fenomenon of self-deception I rely on early experimental evidence and so called paradoxes of self-deception. I will explain in detail two main apraches to the problem of self-deception, one of which is intentional, and the other one is non-intentional. In this context I will try to explain why I believe that self-deception has to be non-intentional.

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