Philosophical presuppositions of two-dimensional semantics

Two-dimensional semantics is only seemingly a unique answer to the problem of meaning. Philosophers prone to two-dimensionalism, generally agree in regard to formal deficiencies arising from intensional semantics. In order to respond to these, they created a specific formal framework including two types of intensions (as opposed to only one used to capture the meaning of terms in intensional semantics). Issues that usually arise regarding this framework independently constitute a very interesting philosophical debate, but, they can also mislead one into conclusion about the identical aims or philosophical aspirations of its participants. The similarities on the formal level, often hide insurmountable conceptual differences in the interpretation of two-dimensional framework: Kaplan uses it to show expression?s context dependence, Stalnaker to capture meta-semantic facts, while Chalmers believes this framework traces a path to the epistemic roots of meaning. In this paper I intend to spotlight these differences.