Can one simply say „no“ to solipsism?

This text is a part of a broader research of the problem of The Other in modern philosophy. Herefrom emerges a specific angle of view for the question of solipsism. In the first place, the principle impossibility of refutation of such a position is demonstrated, thereupon the author makes a short review of Sartre's analysis of the solipsism problem in Being and Nothingness, traditional argument from analogy and Wittgenstein's analysis in The Philosophical Investigations, and finally he analyzes the defensive and offensive variant of solipsism. Inversely, by virtue of impossibility solipsism confirmation, the motives that position and its consequences on practical sphere are analyzed, too. The author also poses the speech beginning question. It turns out that consequent solipsism shows the need for God’s prerogatives, but in practical situation its method is much more down the earth: The Other (alius) is firstly derogated to mere other (aliud) and thereafter to sameness - such Other is now well suited for asimilation. In the end, the author shows the contradictions of Gorgian formalistic solipsism. Nevertheless some positive aspects of solipsistic possibility are pointed out, too: solipsism is the transcendental condition of subjectivity in general and, just as The Transcendent Other, it is constituitve for subjectivity