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Open-handed ontologists
Author(s) -
Ivo Kara-Pešić
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo1002019k
Subject(s) - epistemology , nothing , generality , metaphysics , philosophy , mistake , object (grammar) , realism , empiricism , psychology , linguistics , political science , law , psychotherapist
The Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects is undoubtedly one of the most interesting, but also one of the most contested ontological theories. The main intent of the Austrian philosopher was to introduce an entirely new philosophical discipline which in comparison to traditional sciences is not conditioned by what he called the prejudice in favor of the reality (actual, existing being). Since we are naturally oriented towards the real, to investigate something, to attribute certain qualities to it, we must suppose that that something exists. The non-real is - according to this conception - a mere nothing, non-existing. Hence the need for a more encompassing theory of objects as such and objects in their totality, not as an overall science of specific sciences, but as an a priori science in its utmost generality and exstension. According to Meinong's own words, the Theory of Objects includes, by its apriority, objects of mathematics, but at the same time is more general than metaphysics, since the latter considers only the totality of the existing or real: its catalogue comprises the totality of objects of a much less exstension than the one giving a totality of the objects of knowledge. The first part of the paper presents a short introduction to the character and work of the Austrian thinker with a review of the Theory of Objects and the famous debate with Bertrand Russell. In the second part, the neomeinongian discussion between the main two currents - eliminativism and realism, is presented

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