
Naturalistic fallacy and open question argument: One century of debate
Author(s) -
Nenad Cekić
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo0803029c
Subject(s) - naturalism , argument (complex analysis) , fallacy , epistemology , philosophy , normative , cognitivism (psychology) , psychology , chemistry , biochemistry , cognition , neuroscience
Maybe the most famous and used notion in relatively short history of metaethics is so called 'naturalistic fallacy'. This term was for the first time used by G. E. Moore in his Prinicipia Ethica. Idea of 'naturalistic fallacy' is based upon 'open-question argument'. Discussion of the scope and real results obtained by this argument is open even in metaethics at the beginning of the 21st Century. Today it is clear that open question is not a proof of invalidity of naturalism or any kind of cognitivism. Still, open-question argument is a very useful tool both in metaethics and in normative theories. In this article reader can find direction of the contemporary debate about naturalistic fallacy, naturalism and some modified versions of classical open-question argument