
Leibniz's critique of Cartesian principles of motion
Author(s) -
Andrej Jandrić
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-081X
pISSN - 0351-2274
DOI - 10.2298/theo0703039j
Subject(s) - cartesian coordinate system , metaphysics , motion (physics) , leaps , context (archaeology) , scalar (mathematics) , class (philosophy) , philosophy , classical mechanics , mathematics , epistemology , physics , geometry , paleontology , financial economics , economics , biology
Velocity of a moving body is a paradigmatic case of vector. In this paper it is argued that this conception of velocity was originally introduced by Leibniz in the context of his critique of Cartesian principles of motion. In Cartesian metaphysics velocity of a moving body is a strictly positive scalar, independent from its direction. As a result of an impact, a body can change its direction and preserve its velocity; such a change would immediately falsify the principle of continuity. In order to save the principle of continuity, Leibniz revised the notion of velocity and reduced the direction of movement to a class of newly conceived directed velocity. It is further shown that negative properties are not allowed in Leibnizian metaphysics. To reconcile the principle of continuity with apparent leaps, Leibniz was forced to deny the existence of atoms: he claimed that the monads, or the true elements of things, had to be indestructible and immaterial