Open Access
Executive pay and market value sensitivity
Author(s) -
Feng-Li Lin
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
panoeconomicus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.289
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 2217-2386
pISSN - 1452-595X
DOI - 10.2298/pan1604411l
Subject(s) - executive compensation , value (mathematics) , enterprise value , sample (material) , compensation (psychology) , market value , economics , business , executive summary , accounting , demographic economics , microeconomics , incentive , finance , psychology , statistics , social psychology , chemistry , mathematics , chromatography
Executive pay relative to that of average workers has risen dramatically worldwide. Such a high level of executive pay raises the question of whether a steep rise in executive pay affects firm value. This study examined the relationship between executive pay and firm value. A panel smooth transition regression model is adopted to determine an optimal level of executive pay that maximizes firm value for a sample of 512 Taiwanese-listed firms over the period 2006-2011. The finding is that when the ratio of executive pay to net income after tax exceeds 2.71%, the firm value increases. The results suggest a correlation between large executive ownership (corresponding to high executive pay) and both increased operational efficiencies and firm value. These findings may be useful when contemplating executive compensation policy