Open AccessEnhancing bank transparency: What role for the supervision authority?
Author(s) -
F. Giuli,
Marco Manzo
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
panoeconomicus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.289
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 2217-2386
pISSN - 1452-595X
DOI - 10.2298/pan0904435g
Subject(s) - sanctions , transparency (behavior) , bond , adverse selection , business , order (exchange) , bond market , corporate bond , market discipline , microeconomics , economics , financial system , finance , political science , law
We apply a three-tier hierarchical model of regulation, developed along the lines of Laffont and Tirole (1993), to an adverse selection problem in the corporate bond market. The bank brings the bonds to the market and informs the potential buyers about the bond risks; a unique benevolent public authority aims at maximising investors' welfare. The main goal is to investigate whether this unique authority is able to fully inform the market on a firm's true credit worthiness when banks, in order to recover doubtful credits, favour the placement of bonds issued by levered firms by concealing their true risk. By establishing the necessary conditions that allow optimal sanctions to produce the first best equilibrium, we show that the core problem of adverse selection in the corporate bond market does not lie so much in the benevolence of the delegated monitoring system, but rather in the possibility of affecting and sanctioning a firm's behavior